Consensus mechanism is the heart of any blockchain network. Many projects have proposed alternative protocols to improve restricted scalability of Proof of Work originated since Bitcoin. As an improvement of Delegated Proof of Stake, in this paper, we introduce a novel consensus, namely, Delegated Proof of Reputation, which is scalable, secure with an acceptable decentralization. Our innovative idea is replacing pure coinstaking by a reputation ranking system essentially based on ranking theories (PageRank, NCDawareRank and HodgeRank).
INTRODUCTION
Together with bitcoin, Proof of Work (PoW) has been introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto [5] since 2008. After that, Ethereum and some other blockchains use PoW protocol as well. People believe that such consensus helps the blockchains to be trustless and secure. Unfortunately, small networks (e.g. Verge and BitcoinGold) are easily vulnerable by 51% attack. Huge ones like Bitcoin and Ethereum are possibly threatened (by political issues, for instance) as miners are centralized into several giant mining pools. In addition, PoW algorithm requires powerful computers to do intensive mathematical computation, hence is energy-inefficient. Another big issue of PoW is restricted scalability. Average numbers of transactions per second (TPS) on Bitcoin and Ethereum are 7 and 15, respectively. This is too slow for mass adoption. When those networks are busy, several individual transactions may take hours or days to be completed, and transaction fee may go up much higher than usual.
Ones proposes Proof of Stake (PoS) as an alternative to PoW. The idea is that instead of possessing expensive and powerful hardware for mining tasks, ones are required to hold or stake (at least) a certain number of coins. Then the network randomly chooses someone to be a block producer. This solution is obviously energy-saving but the long-range attack and the nothing at stake problems arise on a PoS system. Furthermore, it may not scale greatly if all coin holders are called for verifying transactions and approving blocks. To solve those issues, several projects, for instances, EOS, Bitshares, use PoS on their blockchain consensus with a modification so-called Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS). Some authors criticize decentralization of such blockchains (as pseudo decentralized models). October 2018, EOS faced a corrupt governance -"mutual voting scandal" [6] .
Vitalik Buterin, father of Ethereum, raises a Blockchain Trilemma that says about a trade-off among "security, decentralization and scalability". While security and decentralization are successfully achieved on several existing PoW blockchains (Bitcoin, Ethereum), scalability is still the most difficult problem.
Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies are in a very beginning stage but have a fantastic potential of application. A countless number of projects have been paying huge effort to build better public blockchains (i.e. Blockchains those are not operated by a single body or a group but open for everyone to join the networks), even Ethereum is in transition from pure PoW to a hybrid (PoW+PoS) to speed up TPS.
In this research, instead of solving the Trilemma, we focus on balance among three essential requirements: "placing security at first, improving scalability and offering an acceptable decentralization". In the next section, we are going to describe DPoS in more details, analyze its pros and cons. In Section 3, we introduce Delegated Proof of Reputation -our novel consensus mechanism as an improvement of DPoS. Therein, PageRank, NCDawareRank and HodgeRank theories are studied to make a theoretic framework for our ranking model. Assessment and comparison with similar ideas of other projects are given. Section 4 discusses, among others, how innovative our solution is, and how it helps resolving vote buying problem happened on EOS and other issues of existing consensus protocols.
DELEGATED PROOF OF STAKE
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Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) is operated as a representative democracy wherein stake holders vote for a small number of witnesses to secure and process transactions on the network. Here, without loss of general idea, we present DPoS on EOS. A coin holder must stake coins in order to join election. More coins are staked, more votes are counted. Staked coins are locked in smartcontracts during voting rounds. Top-21 elected-delegates will be the block producers (BPs) who validate transactions, create new blocks and maintain the network, i.e. be responsible for the whole network operation. A block producer (BP) gets rewards regarding his work. Other delegates in Top-72 receive little rewards as well to serve as standby BPs. A BP may be voted off if missing his turn or be punished due to any compromise to the network. The punishment (possibly freezing or confiscating) is executed on the number of staked coins in his smartcontract. Thus, DPoS mechanism can help solving fundamental problems (the nothing at stake, the long-rang attack and weak subjectivity) of a naive PoS system. The rationales of DPoS essentially differ from PoW.
• Coin holders have a partially control on the network by their votes, and a chance to earn dividends. In contrary, PoW systems reward miners only. Miners may not own any coin, so they try best to maximize their profit. This causes a potential conflict between coin owners and mining bodies.
• DPoS significantly reduces the cost of network operation and maintenance while maximizes performance of blockchains, particularly scalability.
Several DPoS-based blockchains have successfully scaled up to thousands of TPS, for examples, EOS, WAVES, Steem. Naturally, PoS is energy-saving but still faces issues from centralized staking. Especially, DPoS model allows a small number of rich guys to control the network so it is not a fully decentralized model. Beside significant advantages, DPoS has several issues.
Less incentive for standby BPs and voters.
In general, DPoS system rewards the vast amount for BPs, a little for standby ones and nothing for voters. Votes from coin holders are important to maintain a partial decentralization of the model. With little reward, standby BPs still pay as equivalent infrastructure cost as BPs to wait for a lucky opportunity.
2.
More centralized approach. The opportunity for a standby one to become a BP is small. In fact, the list of BPs (Top-21 delegates) of EOS network is almost unchanged for a long time (read more "mutual voting scandal" [6] ). Despite of voting, there is lack of diversity on the BP nodes and the whole network operation is in control of few richest bodies. This contradicts the decentralization philosophy of public blockchains.
3. Improvement approach: our idea is to integrate working and staking into a consensus mechanism, giving proportional right of control and operation to application developers and coin holders.
Fixing security as priority, we study how to balance decentralization and scalability of a blockchain that is expected to satisfy all parties on the network. Then our targets are a high throughput blockchain and an acceptable decentralized system. We are going to present our novel consensus mechanism, namely Delegated Proof of Reputation, in the next section, that can solve the current issues of DPoS while inherits all its advances.
DELEGATED PROOF OF REPUTATION
As proposed in the last section, we introduce working (or performance) factors to a modification of DPoS consensus mechanism. Application developers are important contributors to the value of a blockchain, since they run their business on its top. They deserve to become network operators. We mean purely staking is not the only way to become a delegate. We replace stake voting by reputation voting. What is reputation?
Reputation Score Engine
Our reputation concept is a combination of three factors: staked amount, resource usage and transaction activity. A node or wallet may govern many addresses. In our voting mechanism, nodes must register official addresses (accounts) for rounds of reputation rating and voting. Thus, in this paper, for simplicity, we use the terms "node, address, account" alternatively without misunderstanding. Instead of pure stake voting, reputation score determines vote weight of an account. Let see our model and explanation in the following.
Vote weight = Reputation score = = ( , , ) = + + P presents stake power of an account computed based-on the number of staked coins.
U indicates (CPU, RAM, bandwidth) resource usage of an account. Such infrastructure is indispensable regarding any internet-based network, hence it should be evaluated.
R is the most significant factor in our innovation. It stands for transaction-based reputation rating of an account. We appreciate active accounts with many (in/out) transactions. Like webhyperlinks, transactions can be considered as a useful indicator for performance of an account and the entire network as well. It seems no benefit (additional values) for the network if coin holders just stake to expect block-producing rewards in DPoS.
Coefficients , , adds up to 1.
Transaction quantity and the total of transferred amounts increases over time. Recent transactions are more meaningful to the current state of a blockchain than old ones (for examples, months or years ago). Thus, a time-based model is necessary for a daily updated reputation ranking system, and it will go with us throughout the following sections.
Stake Power
Unlikely DPoS, we don't convert a staked amount instantly to the whole vote weight. If an account has an amount to be count for staking, it is an automatic process to move 10% to a staking smartcontract every day, then convert to stake power.
Assume that an account initially stakes coins. To avoid infinite division, we require a common threshold as the minimum of coins (for all stake amounts) to be sent to staking smartcontract.
where is the number of coins stored in the account's staking smartcontract (i.e. convertible amount, accumulatively added 10% of the current stake per day), is the total sum of coins in all staking smartcontracts in the entire network, and is stake power of the account, all parameters are computed at d-th day. Every day, the total stake power in the entire network always equals 1. When the number of the stake coins is smaller than the threshold, all the (current) stake coins will be sent to the smartcontract, making the full convertible amount as the initial stake. Note that only coins in staking smartcontracts are converted to stake power. Fig 1 is an illustration for the case = 1000, = 100, < ⇔ > 21.8. The convertible amount is full, i.e. = = 1000 at = 22 afterward.
Figure 1. Convertible amount vs days (full amount at d=22)
Why does it need days to convert to full stake power? We think that time is necessary for accounts to show their behaviors. If somebody stakes a huge number of coins for bad purposes, they cannot achieve in few days because our stake converter doesn't allow a strong power in a short time. For a fixed common threshold, larger amounts need more days to reach full convertibility. On the other hand, the converter encourages longrun accounts by accumulative stake power mechanism. Note that in our procedure, an account owner can increase his stake coins anytime but the threshold and 10% converting proportion are fixed for the entire network as a common agreement.
Since coin price changes according to market demand and sentiment, one can set a fiat-equivalence for the threshold, for example, ≈ $100 ± 10. Once the upper or lower margins are broken, the minimum coin threshold will change corresponding to the given fiat value.
Resource Usage
Computing infrastructure are indispensable to operate and maintain any blockchain network and on-top applications. Thus, we evaluate CPU, RAM, storage and bandwidth usage. We set the optimal usage (weighted as 1) from 68% to 88% of the available processing resource. Let be the average resource usage ratio of an account within one day. More concrete, we have the following framework to evaluate resource usage score of an account. All parameters are computed within d-th day.
• = average used resources the account's processing capability is a dynamic quantity, changes over time (e.g. by hour and day). • = the account's capability the system's capability is a relatively stable quantity.
, evaluation score increases as x. This generally encourages transactions when the system is in leisure status.
• 0.68 ≤ ≤ 0.88, = , evaluation score equals 1. This presents the optimal resource usage. ( − 1) , evaluation score decreases as x. This discourages activities when the system is busy, so requires expansion of processing capacity.
• Time-based weight is , > 1, 0 ≤ < 1. The exponential function gives preference to recent activities rather than those of many days or months ago, no preference if = 0.
Figure 2. Evaluation score vs resource usage ratio
The total resource usage across the network is usually less than 1 (in fact, ∑ all accounts ≤ 1 ). The average weighted (resource usage) score of the account within n days is the sum = stake coins 10% / day staking smartcontract convert stake power
. We refer readers to Subsection 3.4.2 (A) and (D) for the detail discussion regarding the exponential term.
In the suggested framework, we apply penalty at nearly zero and almost 100 percent, since those are the two critical points (extremely idle and over rushing) of computers and internet bandwidth. Ones may change our framework (score function) or make another regarding their concrete problems and blockchain economics. Readers can find detailed explanation in EOS.IO document [8].
Reputation Ranking
In Section 2, we mentioned the lack of knowledge when common voters assess the delegates. Staked amount (by DPoS mechanism) is insufficient. How well do the delegates perform over time? This question motivates us to introduce a performance factor to DPoS consensus.
Clearly, connection and linkages make value of any network. A node within a network is important somehow if there are linkages that refer to it. More referring linkages, more important a node seems to be. This is the essential idea of PageRank [2] . Among millions of web-pages, relative importance of a page is evaluated by hyperlinks referring to it. PageRank mathematically models web pages as vertices and hyperlinks as edges of a directed graph. Various algorithms to rank web pages are proposed, and they are a core part of web search engines (for instance, Google Search). As an efficient alternative to PageRank, NCDawareRank [1] was introduced in 2013 which is resistant to link spamming and gives a block-structure approach to the web graph. Another ranking theory that can be applied here is HodgeRank [7] , which exploits the graph Helmholtzian to decompose edge flows into two orthogonal components: gradient flows (comprising a global ranking) and divergence-free flows (validating the global rank). NEM project [3] introduced Proof of Importance (PoI) based on NCDawareRank to rate node performance. However, we find limitations in NEM ranking model as well as application of NCDawareRank to rating problem on nodes of a blockchain network. The details are discussed in next subsections. Comparison and suitability assessment among three mentioned theories help choosing the best one for our reputation ranking system. Then, we will build a theoretical ranking model for a blockchain network.
Web Ranking Theories: a Brief Comparison
Assume the we have a set of n web pages with an out-link matrix = ( ), where is the number of links from page u to page v. Let = ∑ is the out-degree of u. We normalize to have a stochastic matrix = ( ), where = 1 if there is a link from u to v, and = 0 otherwise. Page rank is defined to be a vector R that assigns rating values over the pages based on the out-link matrix. In a simple way, R=cAR, i.e. R is an eigenvector (with unit-L1 norm) corresponding to the largest eigenvalue c. However, to prevent the effect of dangling pages (i.e. the pages with no out-link), the damping factor and a teleportation matrix E are introduced. Let p be the probability vector that initially assigns an even rating (1/n) to all pages, and = , where e is the identity vector with all 1-entries. Then we obtain a PageRank model [2] = + (1 − ) , = .
As a generalization of PageRank, NCDawareRank [1] introduce a new term, the inter-level proximity matrix P, that exploits an important property that the Web can be partitioned into nearly completely decomposable (NCD) blocks. Let { } 1 be an NCDblock partition on the web graph. Any page u is contained in a unique block Bi, we denote B(u) for convenience. Let Gu be the set of pages that u refers to, and Xu be the set of proximal pages of u,
= 0 otherwise, where is the number of distinct blocks in . The resulting matrix is
Matrix P can be factorized into two extremely sparse matrices, making NCDawareRank algorithm more computationally efficient. Unsimilar to the flat way that PageRank treats the pages, the rationales behind NCDawareRank are: (i) web-pages are organized into websites (considered as basic blocks) which has dense internal linkages but low density of hyperlinks with other sites; (ii) the importance is transferred not only from page-to-page but also between websites (blocks). Thus, block-structure approach helps NCDawareRank resistant to link spamming (see more arguments in [1]). However, scanning proximal pages is a heavy task, takes long time to complete.
HogeRank [7] deals with the rating problem in a distinguished and general way. Using combinatorial Hodge theory, it exploits the graph Helmholtzian to provide a beautiful ranking theory. HodgeRank views edge flows as pairwise rankings, then decomposes it into three orthogonal components as followed.
The first component gives us a global ranking and the sum of the last two terms tells us how good the rating is.
Before going to interpretation in details, we need some preliminaries. A Markov chain on the pages is given by = + 1− (PageRank model). Then an edge flow is =log , and weight = 1 if + > 0 and = 0 otherwise. Therefore, = ( ) is skew symmetric, and = ( ) is a symmetric {0, 1}-valued matrix. HodgeRank [7] aims to find a rank-2 skew symmetric matrix X that approximates Y and satisfies = − , where : → ℝ is a real-valued function and V is the set of vertices (nodes). Thus, X induces a global ranking via the rule ≼ if and only if ≤ . Furthermore, is the unique score function (up to an additive constant) that assigns each node u a rating score = ( ), hence the ranking vector = ( ). The minimizer X* is the solution of the least square problem
HodgeRank doesn't need the proximity matrix. In the view of computation complexity, the least square problem of HodgeRank is less expensive than eigenvector computing proposed by PageRank and NCDawareRank. We are going to get a deeper insight of the Hodge decomposition. 
Hodge decomposition
Edge flows = (Gradient ⊕ Harmonic ⊕ Curl) flows.
Divergence-free flows = Harmonic flows ⊕ Curl flows.
The gradient flows comprise the globally consistent (or acyclic) pairwise rankings which induce a unique rating score function on the nodes. The divergence-free flows (in which in-flows and outflows of each node are equal) are interpreted as cyclic rankings (i.e. of the form ≼ ≼ ≼ ⋯ ≼ ) and of course they are inconsistent. The sum of the gradient and harmonic flows is the subspace of curl-free flows on every triangle and it is locally consistent. The harmonic component is both curl-free and divergence-free, is locally consistent but not globally. The last term is locally cyclic or globally inconsistent. Naturally, our greatest concern is the gradient flows which induce a globally consistent ranking. However, divergence-free flows are useful for validation. If they are small (measured by a norm) compared to the gradient flows, then our ranking vector and rating scores are good and reliable. Furthermore, harmonic flows and curl flows can give us some insight (e.g. which nodes and how large their flows are involved) to apply penalty on spamming nodes. We have pairwise ranking = global ranking ⊕ local inconsistency⊕ global inconsistency.
HodgeRank is not only a good approximation to the PageRank stationary distribution but also a useful technique to study the inconsistency in PageRank Markov model. In the next subsection, we will discuss in more details to see that HodgeRank theory is the best choice for our ranking problem on blockchain nodes. Then a mathematical ranking model is given and carefully analyzed. Table 1 sums up a theoretic comparison among the three mentioned ranking theories. 
A Ranking Model of a Blockchain Network
There are three essential distinctions between the Web and a blockchain network.
1. Hyperlinks carry no value while transactions transfer cryptocurrency. In an internet of value, transaction manipulation is highly costed and difficult, not so easy as hyperlink-boosting. In general picture, spamming moneytransfer is unlikely to appear, except for zero-transaction-fee network. 2. In web ranking, all links are similar connection indicators.
Between two accounts in a blockchain network, there are possibly many transactions with different transferred amounts over time. They should not be excluded or treated the same. 3. Within a website, the pages usually have a dense internal interaction while less external connection (i.e. with other websites). This leads researchers to study block structure of the Web graph. In contrary, a user may govern multiple accounts (or addresses) on a blockchain but internal transfer is rare, while transactions are usually executed with others. Thus, block structure approach (in NCDawarerank) is appropriate for the Web but not precisely suitable for blockchains (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 in the Appendix for an evidence on Ethereum).
Our target is to build a mathematical model that can represent a blockchain with all essential characteristics. We view an address as a vertex in the graph. Each transaction is an edge connecting two addresses (2 vertices), distinguished by in/out transfer, i.e. making the graph directed. Assume that we are computing reputation ranking score with the following assumptions.
• There are n consecutive blocks { } 1 collected within d days, B1 is the oldest block and Bn is the latest one.
•
The sum of all transferred coins in each block Bk is Ck and the total is = 1 + 2 + ⋯ + .
The number of all transactions in each block Bk is Tk and the total is = 1 + 2 + ⋯ + .
There are m accounts { } 1 with at least one transaction (in fact, transaction list of a block doesn't contain any address without any transaction).
On a blockchain, we concern the number of transactions and the transferred amounts. Firstly, viewing blockchain as internet of value, we consider transacted amounts. Contrasting to NEM [3] , we don't set a minimum of coins in each transaction to be counted for rating rounds. This, together with zero-fee transaction, makes our model more suitable for micro-payment (an essential expected-application of Blockchain and cryptocurrency). One more distinction to NEM, we still calculate reputation rating of accounts with zero stake power (i.e. without staking), so diversify the voters and the delegates.
(A) A model of transaction amounts
Regardless transaction times, assume that at block Bk, account Ai transfers xk coins to account Aj, then we calculate the weighted transaction as followed
where ⌈ ⌉ is the ceiling function mapping the least integer greater than or equal to z, hence � � is the birthday of k-th block. The second term assigns preference to later block with a base > 1 and a shrinkage coefficient ≥ 0 fixed for every block and rating round (in NEM, = ≈ 2.72, − = ln 0.9). Shrinkage is useful because recent activities have more meaning to the current state of the network than very old transactions (for instance, happened months or years ago). A transaction amount weight decreases to nearly zero if the number of days is large enough. Fig 3 shows how an amount of 1000 weighted over days, = 2, = 0.02, = 10000. If d is small (e.g. d < 10 days), the exponential term doesn't have a significant effect and can be ignored ( = 0).
Varying n blocks, the total weighted out-transfers from Ai to Aj is
The equation guarantees that transactions with zero coin worth nothing in the total weights. In NEM model [4] , the outlink matrix is given by positive net flow only, i.e.
We have a different mindset that every transaction is meaningful somehow, it should be preserved in the mathematical model. Therefore, our (weighted) out-transfer matrix is
normalized corresponding to the total transferred coins within a rating round. Here, we apply shrinkage on Ck to obtain the denominator for normalization (which assigns higher preference to later transaction volumes) in the out-transfer matrix.
If the duration of block collecting is short, for examples, several days, ones can ignore shrinkage, hence
If the shrinkage is used, it should be applied in computing both the out-transfer weights and the out-transfer matrix. 
=
According to [7] , a reversible Markov chain X has a pairwise ranking flow
where is a stationary distribution, and log gives the global ranking. Therefore, we aim to find * = argmin � − � 2 , which is compatible with Equation (1). This implies that the Hodge decomposition of edge flows gives us the best reversible approximation of the Markov chain, and * is exactly the gradient flows that induces a globally consistent ranking and a rating score function.
(B) A model of the number of transactions On blockchains, perhaps, there are transactions without any transferred cryptocurrency, for example, personal or privacy sharing, physician's credential. In micro-payment networks, the number of transactions is huge while a single transacted amount may be cents. Now, we consider the number of transactions in each block without caring about currency-value. Assume that in block Bk, there are tk (out) transfers from account Ai to account Aj. Then we calculate = �− � �� , and � = � �− � �� .
All other things are the same as model (A).

(C) A compound model
Ones may wish to combine the two models (A) and (B). Simply, we can obtain a composed index by taking the arithmetic mean of the two rating scores given by the models (A) and (B). Another way, we roughly take the sum
However, the quantities and are in far different sense, hence there is probably a significant bias that badly effect the ranking. Ones can take the numbers of transactions as the weights in Equation (1). This paper limits not to give an extensive analysis and assessment regarding the compound model.
Developers can choose a single model either (A) or (B) for their ranking system. The other then provides a useful supplement index to help voters make decision.
(D) Computation issue with the shrinkage
The exponential shrinkage term gives us a beautiful time-based meaning of transactions. However, it has a computation issue. Nothing for the first voting round but on all subsequent rounds, the parameters d (number of collecting days) and n (number of blocks) increase, we must re-calculate all the weights in (2). This is a waste of time and computational resource. Can we find a better way to assign preference to later transactions? A feasible solution to avoid re-calculation is a function increasing over days (not decreasing like the shrinkage). In mathematical view, the graphs of − and ( > 0) are symmetric with respect to the vertical axis, intersects at the origin. Therefore, we can compute
where is the day when block k is born (it is easy to find based on time-stamp on each block). Fig 4 shows how an amount ofWithin 180 days of block collecting, there are many rating rounds (e.g. daily basic). The same amount of 1000 has different weights by days. According to the increasing model, old transactions have fixed weights, hence don't need to be re-calculated. Recent transactions always gain higher appreciation than older ones. An amount of 1000 at the first day is weighted equivalently 8% of the same amount in the new-born block at the 180-th day.
No matter increasing or decreasing weighting models, a common point is that transactions happened six months ago are relatively meaningless, so we can consider ignoring them and restart the collecting cycle (i.e. put another first day). 
Reputation Score
Assume that from the gradient flow in Hodge decomposition (or from PageRank, or from NCDawareRank), we obtain a ranking vector that assigns rating scores (unit-L1 norm) R over the nodes. Together with normalized stake power (P) and resource usage (U), we compute the final reputation scores (Rep) of an account (a node) as followed (4) where 1 + 2 + 3 = 1.
Since a blockchain network does have few transactions in the beginning stage, developers can set a dominant rate for stake power, for example, 1 = 0.8, 2 = 0.2, 3 = 0. Months later may be 1 = 0.6, 2 = 0.3, 3 = 0.1. A suggestion for long-term perspective is 1 = 0.4, 2 = 3 = 0.3. The focal point of our consensus mechanism is a comprehensive balance between benefit and responsibility over all network participants. We believe that our reputation ranking system is fair among stake holders, resource contributors and application developers. Almost accounts on the network have positive reputation scores without any limitation or eligibility condition. Stake power enables coin holders to gain vote weight but not instantly strong. They need long-run to reach maximal power. Resource usage reflects the hardware and internet infrastructure that is crucial to operate and maintain a blockchain. Reputation ranking presents the transaction and business activities, the vital characteristic of a network.
FURTHER DISCUSSION
Firstly, our Delegated Proof of Reputation (DpoR) can be considered as "semi-decentralization", decentralization in the sense of reputation voting and semi in the side of delegated block producers. Distributing reputation ranking to almost network participants makes a great diversity on voters, delegates and BPs (greater than DPoS of EOS or PoI of Nem). Therefore, no specific body or group has a dominate control on the network.
Unlikely instant stake counting in DPoS, full stake power applies for long-runners in DPoR. Staked amount needs days to be converted to stake power, meanwhile the holders must show their honesty to be elected. Thus, rich guys cannot gain an immediately strong impact on the network. Now, application developers are granted a controlling opportunity on a blockchain. They make the main value of a network via their business and transactions. That why we invent proof of reputation as a sophisticated balance between the two most important groups: application developers (value makers) and coin holders (value owners). We also believe that running business is more important than holding money. Thus, we suggest a 60% weight to resource usage and reputation ranking, greater than 40% of stake power. This incentivizes developers to build and expand their business on the network, and helps preventing malicious whales.
Furthermore, our converter helps reducing the staking vs cash flow conflict. Cash flow measures health of an economy and should be promoted. In contrast, DPoS requires a significant amount for staking, so reduces coin circulation. In our DPoR, staking is not the dominate factor, hence it doesn't affect negatively to cash flow. Transaction-based rating, on the other side, is an incentive for coin flows to move more actively, then improves liquidity of the economy.
Note that our reputation score engine is not real-time running. It is computed periodically after a long period of time (for example, hourly or daily basic), hence doesn't affect the processing efficiency of the nodes and the entire network. Moreover, nodes without powerful processors may refer to the reputation scores computed by others or separately independent machines of a third audit party, for instance, a statistical analytic firm. then we do not need to care much about them, and our global ranking are reliable. If they are sufficiently large, then we decompose div into harmonic and curl components to study local and global inconsistency of the pairwise ranking. This is the most beautiful thing of HodgeRank theory.
Nodes with many accounts. If a node owns many accounts, its reputation ranking score is the sum of rating scores of all the accounts. This is a simple treat without any unfair problem.
Boosting coin flow (loop attack).
Dishonest nodes may transfer coins around the accounts under their governance many times (see Fig 5) in order to gain higher reputation score, since DPoR appreciates quantity and value of transactions. To fight against boosting, NEM proposed positive net flow for PoI (i.e. net flow equals out-flow minus in-flow if the difference is positive, and zero otherwise). A loop of thousands (or more) of transactions, therefore, doesn't worth higher importance score. However, NEM's convention has a limitation when ignores the case of negative difference. We believe that every transaction has some meaning, so we try to preserve all by another solution. Equation (3) constructs the transferring (edge flow) matrix by ratio between in-flow and out-flow, hence preserves all information while guarantees that multi-transactions in a loop isn't worthier than once (for example, 1000:1000 = 1:1). More important, the ratio keeps some useful information for Hodge decomposition, then all loops are classified and contained in harmonic and curl flows. Thus, all boosting nodes do not gain higher scores in global ranking (which is induced by gradient flows). Therefore, DPoR is resistant to boosting (and Sybil attack as well). Electors will refer to that coin flows, assess node honesty and decide who they should vote for.
Increasing computation load over time. The shrinkage in Equation (2) says that all transactions older than one year are weighted nearly zero, hence we can skip them. However, collected blocks within several months possibly contains thousands of accounts and multi-millions of transfers, while DPoR still computes old-months-transactions. Although we suggest an increasing exponential term to avoid re-compute shrinkage weights (see Subsection 3.4.2 (D)), the out-transfer matrix needs updates. This causes a huge waste of time and computation resource.
Figure 5. Transfers in loops
In this paper, we review several major blockchains, their consensus mechanisms together with advantages and disadvantages. Then we suggest innovation ideas for conventional DPoS. Ranking theories (PageRank, NCDawareRank, HodgeRank) are studied to introduce a novel consensus mechanismDelegated Proof of Reputation. Analysis on ranking theories are given. A mathematical model is constructed for DPoR together with extensive discussion and comparison with others. Although HodgeRank is our best choice, various options and parameters are given to make our framework as much general and flexible as possible for researchers and developers' reference. Nevertheless, within this research, we cannot give a comprehensive review on advances and limitations of DPoR. Theoretical framework is given but experiments are necessary to validate suitability of HodgeRank to DPoR and to evaluate the reputation score engine. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our reputation ranking mechanism, in general, can apply in many systems, not only on blockchain consensus, for example, credit, social reputation and rating. Regarding ranking problem on blockchain, PageRank is still a good choice. NCDawareRank has many advantages on the web-graph but less likely works well here. HodgeRank seems to be the best theory for our scenarios because of several competitive edges: (i) it is a good approximation of PageRank; (ii) its least square method for score function is algebraically more computationally efficient and surely convergent than eigenvector problem; (iii) it is resistant to transaction boosting/manipulation because all loops are contained in divergence-free flows, not in gradient flows (which induce the global ranking); (iv) it provides a beautiful decomposition to study inconsistency of the ranking; (v) online algorithms for HodgeRank [4] are available and can help solving intensive computation load at larger scale over time.
We know that a lot of future investigations needed to be conducted. We are building a blockchain based on Delegated Proof of Reputation (see https://umbala.network/). Experiments are necessary to verify our innovative ideas and theoretical framework before running testnet.
Although DPoR is theoretically resistant to loop attack, we want a useful tool to prevent boosting intention. Millions of boosted transactions worth nothing while they increase block producers' workload and network's data volume. Transaction fee can discourage boosting flow. However, our project, Umbala Network, applies fee-less transaction strategy to serve micro-payment. A suggestion is creating a smart filter based on Hodge decomposition or a boosting detector based on artificial intelligence techniques. An eligible minimum of stake power to be delegating candidates may reduce boosting intention from nodes, since punishment (freezing or confiscating staking coins) can be applied on nodes whose coin flows are in harmonic and curl subspaces (i.e. with global inconsistency).
A solution to avoid repeating computation on the old blocks of the previous rating rounds is helpful. We mean an updatable algorithm for reputation score computing. Online HodgeRank [5] gives online preferential attachment sampling and online algorithms to update rating and track curl flows. How can we apply to blockchain model and the updating problem?
A partial reward for voters is a good incentive to maintain a high decentralization level in voting rounds. A more comprehensive assessment on DPoR and comparison with others is useful for blockchain application developers.
To conclude this paper, we would like to emphasize that the text is limited to giving theoretic frameworks for Delegated Proof of Reputation. Practical implementations and supporting experiments will be presented in next investigations with concrete usecases.
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APPENDIX
In the following, we provide two graphs of transactions on Ethereum Network. The graphs are highly disconnected and can be absolutely separated into small clusters. Most of them are of 2, 3 or 4 nodes. There are several crowd blocks but no connection among them. Moreover, linkages within a block is highly monotonous, i.e. the nodes link to a hub (a central node), e.g. exchanges, applications, mining pools, but not to other neighbors. Thus, the advantages of NCDawareRank is unlikely to work on blockchains. 
